Abstract-This paper studies binary hypothesis testing based on measurements from a set of sensors, a subset of which can be compromised by an attacker. The measurements from a compromised sensor can be manipulated arbitrarily by the adversary. The asymptotic exponential rate, with which the probability of error goes to zero, is adopted to indicate the detection performance of a detector. In practice, we expect the attack on sensors to be sporadic, and therefore the system may operate with all the sensors being benign for extended period of time. This motivates us to consider the trade-off between the detection performance of a detector, i.e., the probability of error, when the attacker is absent (defined as efficiency) and the worst-case detection performance when the attacker is present (defined as security). We first provide the fundamental limits of this trade-off, and then propose a detection strategy that achieves these limits. We then consider a special case, where there is no trade-off between security and efficiency. In other words, our detection strategy can achieve the maximal efficiency and the maximal security simultaneously. Two extensions of the secure hypothesis testing problem are also studied and fundamental limits and achievability results are provided: 1) a subset of sensors, namely "secure" sensors, are assumed to be equipped with better security countermeasures and hence are guaranteed to be benign; 2) detection performance with unknown number of compromised sensors. Numerical examples are given to illustrate the main results.
I. INTRODUCTION
Background and Motivations: Network embedded sensors, which are pervasively used to monitor the system, are vulnerable to malicious attacks due to their limited capacity and sparsely spatial deployment. An attacker may get access to the sensors and send arbitrary messages, or break the communication channels between the sensors and the system operator to tamper with the transmitted data. Such integrity attacks have motivated many researches on how to infer useful information from corrupted sensory data in a secure manner [1] - [3] . In this paper, we follow this direction but with the focus on the trade-off between the performance of the inference algorithm when the attacker is absent and the "worst-case" performance when the attacker, which has the knowledge of the inference algorithm, is present. We define two metrics, efficiency and security, to characterize the performance of the hypothesis testing algorithm (or detector) under the two scenarios respectively and analyze the trade-off between security and efficiency.
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sensors. It is assumed that n out of these m sensors may be compromised by an attacker, the set of which is chosen by the attacker and fixed over time. The adversary can manipulate the measurements sent by the compromised sensors arbitrarily 1 . According to Shannon's Maxim [4] , i.e., the security of a system should not rely on its obscurity, we assume that the adversary knows exactly the hypothesis testing algorithm used by the fusion center. On the other hand, the fusion center (i.e., the system operator) only knows the number of malicious sensors n, but does not know the exact set of the compromised sensors.
At each time k, the fusion center needs to make a decision about the underlying hypothesis based on the possibly corrupted measurements collected from all sensors until time k. Given a hypothesis testing algorithm at the fusion center (i.e., a measurements fusion rule), the worst-case probability of error is investigated, and the asymptotic exponential decay rate of the error, which we denote as the "security" of the system, is adopted to indicate the detection performance. On the other hand, when the attacker is absent, the detection performance of a hypothesis testing algorithm, i.e., the asymptotic exponential decay rate of the error probability, is denoted by the "efficiency".
We focus on the trade-off between efficiency and security. In particular, we are interested in characterizing the fundamental limits of the trade-offs between efficiency and security and the detectors that achieve these limits.
The main contributions of this work are summarized as follows:
1) To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that studies the trade-off between the efficiency and security of any inference algorithm. 2) With mild assumptions on the probability distributions of the measurements, we provide the fundamental limits of the trade-off between the efficiency and security (Corollaries 1 and 2). Furthermore, we present detectors, with low computational complexity, that achieve these limits (Theorem 4). Therefore, the system operator can easily adopt the detectors we proposed to obtain the best trade-off between efficiency and security. Interestingly, in some cases, e.g., Gaussian random variables with same variance and different mean, the maximal efficiency and the maximal security can be achieved simultaneously (Theorem 5). 3) Similar results, i.e., the fundamental limits of the tradeoff and the detectors that possess these limits, are established with several different problem settings (Section V). This shows that our analysis techniques are insightful and may be helpful for the future related studies. Related Literature: Minimax robust detection [5] - [8] considers the hypothesis testing problem when the sensory data follow uncertain probability distributions. The classical approach to the minimax robust detection is to identify the "least favorables" among the allowable set of uncertainties first, and then perform a probability ratio test between the "least favorable" pair of distributions. These allowable sets usually consist of a nominal element and others that are somewhat "close" to this nominal one [7] . Even though a malicious attack on measurements can be viewed as uncertainties on the data model, it is not guaranteed that the "least favorable" pair exists. Furthermore, there is not constructive and systematic ways to find the "least favorable" pair. Therefore, it is unclear whether the robust detection framework can be used to combat malicious attacks. Finally, notice that the efficiency and security may be regarded as the performance of a detection scheme under nominal conditions and the worst-case conditions in the robust detection regime, respectively. However, the trade-offs between these two have not been considered in the literature.
Robust estimators, such as M-estimator, L-estimator, Sestimator, have been well studied [8] . The robustness of an estimator is usually measured by a breakpoint [9] or influence curve [10] . In the security settings, [11] proposed an estimator based on solving a l 0 optimization problem, and [12] derived a secure Kalman filter based on LASSO [13] . Without solving complicated optimization problems, our detector is simple and has low computational complexity. Nevertheless, our focus is on the trade-off between security and efficiency, which has not been touched by the literature.
Detection with so-called Byzantine sensors has been studied in [14] , [15] . In [14] , the authors took the perspective of the attacker and proposed a "water-filling" procedure to determine the worst attack strategy in which the KullbackLeibler (K-L) divergence is minimized. Since the Byzantine sensors are assumed to generate independent and identical distributed data, the resulting measurements with minimum K-L divergence and the corresponding robust detector coincide with those in [5] . In [15] , a different performance index than in [14] is adopted and the Byzantine sensors can collaborate when generating malicious data. The optimal policy when the number of Byzantine sensors is less than 1/2 is shown to be with a threshold structure. Detection with Byzantine sensors have also been studied in a game-theoretic way [16] , [17] , where zero-sum games were formulated and equilibrium of attack strategies and detectors is obtained. The aforementioned literature mainly focuses on designing algorithms in adversarial environment. However, those algorithms may perform poorly in the absence of the adversary comparing to the classic Neyman-Pearson detector or Naive Bayes detector. A fundamental question, which we seek to answer in this paper, is that how to design a detection strategy which performs "optimally" regardless of whether the attacker is present.
Organization: In Section II, we formulate the problem of binary hypothesis testing in adversarial environments, in which the attack model, the performance indices and the notion of the efficiency and security are defined. For the sake of completeness, we give a brief introduction the large deviation theory in Section III, which is a key supporting technique for the later analysis. The main results are presented in Section IV. We first provide the fundamental limits of the trade-off between the efficiency and security. We then propose detectors that achieve these limits. At last, we show that the maximal efficiency and the maximal security can be achieved simultaneously in some cases. Two extensions are investigated in Section V. After providing numerical examples in Section VI, we conclude the paper in Section VII.
Notations: R (R + ) is the set of (nonnegative) real numbers. N + is the set of positive integers. The cardinality of a finite set I is denoted as |I|. For a set A ∈ R n , int(A) denotes its interior. For any sequence {x(k)} ∞ k=1 , we denote its average at time k asx(k) k t=1 x(t)/k. II. PROBLEM FORMULATION Consider the problem of detecting a binary state θ ∈ {0, 1} using m sensors' measurements. Define the measurement y(k) at time k to be a row vector:
where y i (k) is the scalar measurement from sensor i at time k. For simplicity, we define Y (k) as a vector of all measurements from time 1 to time k:
Given θ, we assume that all measurements {y i (k)} i=1,...,m, k=1,2,... are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.). The probability measure generated by y i (k) is denoted as ν when θ = 0 and it is denoted as µ when θ = 1. In other words, for any Borel-measurable set A ⊆ R, the probability that y i (k) ∈ A equals ν(A) when θ = 0 and equals µ(A) when θ = 1. We denote the probability space generated by all measurements y(1), y(2), . . .
The expectation taken with respect to P o θ is denoted by E o θ . We further assume that ν and µ are absolutely continuous with respect to each other. Hence, the log-likelihood ratio λ :
where dµ/dν is the Radon-Nikodym derivative. We define f k : R mk → [0, 1], the detector at time k, as a mapping from the measurement space Y (k) to the interval [0, 1]. When f k (Y (k)) = 0, the system makes a decisionθ = 0, and when f k (Y (k)) = 1,θ = 1. When f k (Y (k)) = γ ∈ (0, 1), the system then "flips a biased coin" to chooseθ = 1 with probability γ andθ = 0 with probability 1 − γ. The system's strategy f (f 1 , f 2 , · · · ) is defined as an infinite sequence of detectors from time 1 to ∞.
A. Attack Model
An adversary wants to deteriorate the performance of the system. Due to resource constraints, the attacker is only capable of compromising n out of the m sensors. The set of the compromised sensors is denoted as I. We assume that the system knows the number n, but it does not know the exact set I. The attacker is assumed to know the probability measure µ and ν and the true state θ. At each time k, the attacker adds a bias vector y a (k) to the true measurement y(k), where
As a result, the manipulated measurements y ′ (k) received by the system is
In the following, we characterize how y a (k) is generated. Similar to Y (k), we define the collection of all manipulated measurements from time 1 to k as
and the bias vector
In this paper, we assume that at time k, the attacker knows the current and all the historical measurements at the compromised sensors 2 . Define
The bias y a (k) is chosen as a function of the attacker's available information at time k:
where g is a function 3 ofỸ (k), Y a (k − 1), I, θ, k. We define g as the attacker's strategy. Denote the probability space generated by all manipulated measurements y ′ (1), y ′ (2), . . . as (Ω, F , P θ ). The expectation taken with respect to the probability measure P θ is denoted by E θ .
B. Asymptotic Detection Performance
Given the strategy of the system and the attacker, the probability of error at time k can be defined as
Notice that f k could take any value from [0, 1]. Hence, the expected value of f k is used to compute the probability of error. In this paper, we are concerned with the worst-case scenario. As a result, let us define
In other words, ǫ(k) indicates the worst-case probability of error considering all possible sets of compromised sensors and the state θ.
Ideally, for each time k, the system wants to design a detector f k to minimize ǫ(k). However, such a task can hardly be accomplished analytically since the computation of the probability of error usually involves numerical integration. Thus, in this article, we consider the asymptotic detection performance in hope to provide more insight on the detector design. Define the rate function as
Clearly, ρ is a function of both the system strategy f and the attacker's strategy g. As such, we will write ρ as ρ(f, g) to indicate such relations. Since ρ indicates the rate with which the probability of error goes to zero, the system would like to maximize ρ in order to minimize the detection error. On the contrary, the attacker wants to decrease ρ to increase the detection error.
C. Interested Problems
In practice, the attacker may not present consistently. As a result, the system will operate for an extended period of time with all sensors being benign. Thus, a natural question arises: is there any detection rule that has "decent" performance regardless of the presence of the attacker? Or is there a fundamental trade-off between security and efficiency? In other words, a detector that is "good" in the presence of an adversary will be "bad" in a benign environment. This paper is devoted to answering this question.
Informally, the performance of a detection rule when there is no attacker at all is referred to by "efficiency", while the performance when the worst-case attacker (provided that the attacker knows the detection rule used by the system) is present is referred to by "security". Mathematically speaking, given a system strategy f , denote by E(f ) and S(f ) its efficiency and security respectively, which are formalized as follows:
III. PRELIMINARY: LARGE DEVIATION THEORY
In this section, we introduce the large deviation theory, which is a key supporting technique of this paper.
To proceed, we first introduce some definitions. Let M ω (w)
R d e w·X dω(X), w ∈ R d be the moment generating function for the random vector X ∈ R d that has the probability measure ω, where w · X is the dot product. Let dom ω {w ∈ R d |M ω (w) < ∞} be the support such that M ω (w) is finite. Define the Fenchel-Legendre transform of the function log M ω (w) as
IV. MAIN RESULTS

A. Technical Preliminaries
Denote the moment generating function of the loglikelihood ratio λ under each hypothesis as:
Furthermore, define dom 0 as the region where M 0 (w) is finite and I 0 (x) as the Fenchel-Legendre transform of log M 0 (w).
The quantities M 1 (w), dom 1 and I 1 (x) are defined similarly. Denote the the Kullback-Leibler (K-L) divergences by
To apply the multidimensional Cramér's Theorem and avoid degenerate problems, we adopt the following assumptions:
With the above assumptions, we have the following properties of I 0 (x) and I 1 (x). the proof of which is provided in Appendix A. 2) The following equalities hold:
Theorem 2. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the followings hold:
Since I 0 (0) = I 1 (0), let us define
To make the presentation clear, we illustrate I 0 (x) and I 1 (x) in Fig. 1 . The "inverse functions" of I 0 (x) and I 1 (x) are defined as follows: for z ≥ 0,
B. Fundamental Limits
We are ready to provide the fundamental limitations between efficiency and security. The proof is provided in Appendix B.
Theorem 3. For any detection rule f , the following statements on E(f ) and S(f ) are true: (11) and (13), one obtains that h(z) is strictly decreasing. Then the dual version of (16a) is obtained as follows.
where h −1 (z) is the inverse function of h(z), and the equality holds because h(z) is an involutory function, i.e., h(h(z)) = z for every z ∈ (0, (m − n)D min ).
We then have the following two corollaries. The results follow straightforwardly from Theorem 3 and (17), we thus omit the proofs.
Corollary 1. Suppose the security of a detector f satisfies
then the maximum efficiency of f satisfies the following inequality:
where h e (z) min{mC, h(z)}.
Corollary 2. Suppose the efficiency of a detector f satisfies
then the maximum security of f satisfies the following inequality:
where h s (z) = min{z, (m − 2n)C, h(z)}, and
C. Achievability
In this section, we propose a detector that achieves the upper bounds in Corollaries 1 and 2.
Let z s ≤ (m−2n)C. At time k ≥ 1, the algorithm, denoted by f * zs , is implemented as follows.
Algorithm 1 Hypothesis testing algorithm f * zs 1: Compute the empirical mean of the likelihood ratio from time 1 to time k for each sensor i:
Compute the following sum: We now show the performance of f * zs and the proof is provided in Appendix C. 
where h e (z s ) is defined in Corollary 1. 
D. Special Case: Symmetric Distribution
In this subsection, we discuss a case where the maximum security and efficiency can be achieved simultaneously by a detector.
Notice that by the definition of admissible pair, if we have
then we know that (z e = mC, z s = (m − 2n)C) is an admissible pair and hence the detector f * (m−2n)C defined in Section IV-C can achieve maximum security (m − 2n)C and efficiency mC simultaneously. In other words, adding security will not deteriorate the performance of the system in the absence of the adversary.
The following theorem provides a sufficient condition for (18) , which is based on the first order derivative of I 0 (·) and I 1 (·). The proof is presented in Appendix D for the sake of legibility. Notice that whether or not the above sufficient condition is satisfied merely depends on the probability distribution of the original observations, which is independent of the number of the compromised sensors.
If there exists "symmetry" between distribution µ and ν, then the sufficient condition can be satisfied. To be specific, if there exists a constant a such that for any Borel measurable set A, we have
which further implies that
We provide two examples of pairs of "symmetric" distributions as follows: 1) Each y i (k) is i.i.d. Bernoulli distributed and y i (k) = θ with probability p 0 1 − θ with probability 1 − p 0 2) Each y i (k) satisfies the following equation:
where a = 0 and
V. EXTENSION
In this section, we consider two extensions to the problem settings discussed in Section IV.
A. Secure Sensors
Consider that there is a subset of "secure" sensors that are well protected and cannot be compromised by the attacker. We would like to study the trade-off between security and efficiency when those "secure" sensors are deployed.
Let m s out of the total m sensors be "secure" and the remaining m − m s sensors are "normal" ones that can be compromised by an adversary. In this subsection, n can take any value in {0, 1, . . . , m − m s } and does not necessarily satisfy 2n < m. The other settings are the same as in Section II. Denote by E s (f ) and S s (f ) the efficiency and security of a detection rule f under such case.
Then one obtains the following results as in Theorem 3.
Theorem 6. For any detection rule f , the following statements on E s (f ) and S s (f ) are true:
The above theorem is proved in the same manner as in Appendix B. Notice that the essential difference is the range of S s (f ), i.e., the statement in the second bullet. This is due to the fact that the m s secure sensors cannot be compromised. Furthermore, the detector f s zs in Algorithm 2, which is a slight variation of f * zs and treats the m s secure sensors separately, achieves the limits. This is stated in the following theorem, which is proved in the same manner as in Appendix C.
Theorem 7.
If the pair (z e , z s ) satisfies
then there holds
Algorithm 2 Hypothesis testing algorithm f 
B. Unknown Number of Compromised Sensors
In the previous section, we assume that if the system is being attacked, then n sensors are compromised. However, in practice, the exact number of compromised sensors is likely to be unknown.
In this subsection, we assume that we know an estimated upper bound on the compromised sensors, denoted by n. Let n a denote the number of the sensors that are actually compromised. Therefore, n a may take value in N {0, 1, 2, . . . n}. Given a detector f , it is convenient to denote by D na (f ) the detection performance when the number of compromised sensor is n a . Then, one has D 0 (f ) = E(f ) and D n (f ) = S(f ). In the following, we present the pairwise trade-off between D na (f ) and D n ′ a (f ) for any 0 ≤ n a , n ′ a ≤ n, and propose an algorithm to achieve these performance limits. A similar argument as in Section IV can be adopted to obtain these results, the details of which are omitted.
We defineh :
whereñ a = n a + n ′ a , and
Then one obtains that for any detector f and n a , n ′ a ∈ N , there hold
Let z (z 0 , z 1 , . . . , z n ) be a n-tuplet of admissible detection performance, i.e.,
Then the detector in Algorithm 3, which is a variation of f * zs in Section IV-C and is denoted by f * z , can achieve these performance, i.e., D na (f * z ) ≥ z na for any n a ∈ N .
Algorithm 3 Hypothesis testing algorithm
While n a ≥ 1 1) Compute these two minima:
2) Ifδ(0, k, n a ) < z na , make a decisionθ = 0 and stop.
3) Ifδ(1, k, n a ) < z na , make a decisionθ = 1 and stop. 4) Replace n a with n a − 1. 3: If m i=1λ i (k) < 0, make a decisionθ = 0; make a decision θ = 1 otherwise.
VI. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
We simulate the performance of the detector f * zs proposed in Section IV-C and compare the empirical results to the theoretical ones in Fig. 2 .
The same parameters as in Fig. 2 are used, i.e., P o 0 (y 1 (1) = 1) = 0.02, P o 1 (y 1 (1) = 1) = 0.6, m = 9 and n = 2. To simulate the security, it is assumed that the following attack strategy is adopted. If θ = 0, the attacker modifies the observations of the compromised sensors such that for every i ∈ I and k ≥ 1
On the other hand, if θ = 1, the attack strategy is such that I 1 (λ i (k)) ≥ z s holds for every i ∈ I and k ≥ 1.
To simulate the performance with high accuracy, we adopt the importance sampling approach [19] . To plot Fig. 3 , we let z s be in [0, (m − 2n)C = 1.5987]. Notice that the theoretical performance of f * zs coincides exactly with the fundamental limits in Fig. 2 . Therefore, Fig. 3 verifies that our algorithm f * zs indeed achieves the fundamental limits. We also compare the finite time performance of our algorithm f * zs with the naive Bayes detector in Fig. 4 , where z s is chosen to be 1.4282. Notice that h(z = 1.4282) = mC = 2.8777. Therefore f * zs possess the maximal efficiency (which is a metric in the asymptotic regime). Fig. 4 illustrates that the algorithm f * zs with z s = 1.4282 has a finite-time detection performance comparable to that of naive Bayes detector when the attacker is absent. One should note that the security of naive Bayes detector is zero, while the security of f * zs is 1.4282. As a result, adopting the secure detector f * zs increases the security of the system while introducing minimum performance loss in the absent of the adversary. 
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we studied the trade-off between the detection performance of a detector when the attacker is absent (termed efficiency) and the "worst-case" detection performance when the attacker, knowing the detector, is present (termed security). The setting is that a binary hypothesis testing is conducted based on measurements from a set of sensors, some of which can be compromised by an attacker and their measurements can be manipulated arbitrarily. We first provided the fundamental limits of the trade-off between the efficiency and security of any detector. We then presented detectors that possesses the limits of the efficiency and security. Therefore, a clear guideline on how to balance the efficiency and security has been established for the system operator. An interesting point of the fundamental trade-off is that in some cases, the maximal efficiency and the maximal security can be achieved simultaneously, i.e., the maximal efficiency (security) can be achieved without compromising any security (efficiency). In addition, two extensions were investigated: secure sensors are assumed for the first one, and the detection performance beyond the efficiency and security is concerned for the second one. The main results were verified by numerical examples. Investigating the problem when the measurements from the benign sensors are not i.i.d. is a future direction.
APPENDIX A THE PROOF OF THEOREM 2
The following lemma is needed to prove Theorem 2:
Lemma 1. If Assumption 1 and 2 hold, then the following statement is true:
1) For any w,
2) There exists a small enough ǫ > 0, such that log M 0 (w) is well-defined on [−ǫ, 1 + ǫ], and log
Proof. By definition,
which proves (21) . Assuming M 0 (w 1 ), M 0 (w 2 ) < ∞ and w 1 < w 2 , by the convexity of the exponential function, we know that for any λ and 0 < α, β < 1 and α + β = 1,
is well-defined, which proves that the domain of log M 0 (w) is convex. Furthermore, by Assumption 1, 0 ∈ int(dom 1 ) gives
It is well known that log M 0 (w) is infinitely differentiable on int(dom 0 ) (see [18, 
always holds, where (log M 0 (w)) (2) is the second derivative. The above quantity is strictly positive since the KL divergence between probability measure µ and ν are strictly positive by Assumption 2. Therefore, log M 0 (w) is strictly convex.
The domain and the strict convexity of log M 1 (w) can be proved similarly.
Take the derivative of log M 0 (w) at w = 1 yields
Equation (23), (24) and (25) can be proved similarly.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 2:
Proof of Theorem 2. Define the derivative of log M 0 (w) to be ψ(w). Since log M 0 (w) is strictly convex, we know that ψ(w) is strictly increasing and therefore, its inverse function is well defined on [−D(0 1), D(1 0)]. Denote the inverse function as ϕ(x). By the convexity of log M 0 (w), we have that
Hence, for any
Notice the last term on the RHS of the equation is non-positive. Hence, we can prove that
Take the derivative and second order derivative of I 0 (x) we have
where the last inequality is due to the fact that log M 0 (w) is strictly convex, and thus its second derivative ψ (1) is strictly positive. Hence we prove that I 0 (x) is twice differentiable and strictly convex on
we can prove that I 0 (x) is also strictly increasing. Similarly we can prove the properties for I 1 (x). Combining (30), (22) and (23), we can prove (10) and (11) . Equation (12) and (13) can be proved similarly.
Since
and
We can conclude I 0 (0) = I 1 (0).
APPENDIX B THE PROOF OF THEOREM 3
The proof is divided into four parts, each of which is devoted to one of the statements in Theorem 3.
Part I. Let M = {1, 2, . . . , m} be the set of all sensors. For index set I ⊂ M and χ ∈ R, define the following Bayesian like detector:
whereλ i (k) is the empirical mean of the log-likelihood ratio from time 1 to k for sensor i:
It is well known that f * M minimize the average error probability [20] : e(θ = 0, I = ∅, k) + e(θ = 1, I = ∅, k), where, recall, e(θ, I, k) is defined in (4) . Notice that
Hence, when the attacker is absent, f * M is optimal in the sense that the rate ρ defined in (6) is maximized. Furthermore, Cramér's Theorem gives that E(f * M ) = mI 0 (0) = mC. Therefore, E(f ) ≤ mC holds for any detector f .
Part II. In this part, we show S(f ) ≤ (m − 2n) + C. The proof is by construction: we construct a attack strategy g * such that, for any detection rule f , the following inequality holds:
Let I ′ = {1, . . . , n} and I ′′ = {m−n+1, . . . , m}. The attack strategy g * is as follows. 
Part IV. Consider the following product measures:
The measure µ a is generated by an attack that flips the distribution on the last n sensors, when the true hypothesis is θ = 1. The measure ν * is generated by benign sensors when the true hypothesis is θ = 0. Now let us consider the following problem: given φ > 0, find the detection rule f such that
is minimized for every k ≥ 1. Let f φ = (f φ,1 , . . . , f φ,k , . . .) with f k,φ given by
where, recall, the function f k,χ,I (Y ′ (k)) is defined in (31). Then by the Bayesian decision-theoretic detection theory, f φ is a solution to the above problem. Let
Then from the optimality of f φ , for any φ > 0 and any detector f = (f 1 , . . . , f k , . . .), the following hold:
This implies that
If lim inf
Furthermore, the definitions of E(f ) and S(f ) yield
Therefore, for any φ > 0 and any detector f , the following hold:
Now let us evaluate E φ and S φ . Letφ = − log φ/(m − n), then Cramér's theorem yields
Notice that the monotonicity of
One thus obtains that for any detector f , if
Also, it is easy to see that if
Similarly, one considers the detection problem for the measures µ k * and ν k a and obtains that for any detector f , if
Then equation (16a) follows from (36) and (38), and equation (16b) from (37) and (39).
APPENDIX C THE PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Before proceeding, we need to define the following subsets of R m :
Definition 3. Let I ⊂ M, j ∈ {0, 1} and z ∈ R + , define a ball as
Definition 4. Let j ∈ {0, 1} and z ∈ R + , define an extended ball as
From the definition of extended balls, it is clear that
if and only if the following inequality holds:
Combining with the definition of f * zs , we know that at time k, the output of f * zs is 0 if and only if
where Λ − (z s ) is defined as
The output is 1 isλ(k) ∈ Λ + (z s ), where
We first need the following supporting lemma.
, the optimal value of the following optimization problem is given by pI 1 (I
Proof. Since I 1 (·) is nonnegative, I 1 (D(1 0)) = 0 and x i can take any value when i / ∈ I 2 , one can equivalently rewrite (40) as inf x∈R m i∈I1∩I2
By the nonnegativity of I 0 (·), the above equation is equivalent to inf x∈R m ,0<z ′ ≤z i∈I1∩I2
To obtain the solution to the above equation, let us fist focus on the following optimization problem:
where I = I 1 ∩ I 2 . Denotes its optimal value by ψ(z ′ ). In the following, we show that
We claim that a solution to (42) is
With this claim, (43) clearly holds. In the following we show that this claim is correct. Equation (44b) is trivial. We then focus on (44a). Due to the convexity of the functions I 0 (·) and I 1 (·), one obtains that for any x ∈ R m ,
Therefore, without any performance loss, one may restrict the solution to the set X * as follows:
Then it is clear from the monotonicity of I 0 and I 1 that (44a) holds. This thus proves (43). Notice that ψ(z ′ ) in (43) is decreasing with respect to z ′ . Then the fact that I 0 (−D(0 1)) = 0 yields that (41) is equivalent to min x∈R m i∈I1∩I2
which concludes Lemma 2 by (43).
Lemma 3. Assume that (z e , z s ) are an admissible pair, then the following statements are true:
3) EBal(0, z s , n) EBal(1, z s , n) = ∅. 4) EBal(1, z s , n) Bal(M, 0, z e ) = ∅. 5) EBal(0, z s , n) Bal(M, 1, z e ) = ∅.
Proof. 1): It suffices to prove that given any x ∈ R m , if x ∈ B + , then x ∈ Bal(M, 0, z e ). By the convexity of I 0 (x), one obtains that i∈M I 0 (x i ) ≥ mI 0 (1/m i∈M x i ) ≥ mI 0 (0) = mC, where the second inequality follows from x ∈ B + and the fact that I 0 (x) is increasing when x ≥ 0. Notice that by its definition, z e ≤ mC holds. The proof is done.
2): This can be proved similarly to 1).
3): By the definition of EBal, we need to prove that for any We are now ready to prove Theorem 4.
Proof of Theorem 4.
We focus on the proof of S(f * zs ) ≥ z s , and a similar (and simpler) approach can be used to prove E(f * zs ) ≥ z e . Notice that EBal(0, z s , n) ⊆ Λ − (z s ) gives that, under any attacks, there holds lim sup 
where the second inequality holds because of Cramér's Theorem and the fact that R m \ Bal(M, 0, z 1 ) is closed. Then we have the following two lemmas on h 0 (z) and h 1 (z).
Lemma 5. Both h 0 (z) and h 1 (z) are convex. Furthermore, the following equality holds:
Proof. The equation (47) follows directly from (14) and (15) .
To prove the convexity of h 0 (z) and h 1 (z), we first need to prove that I The convexity of h 0 (z) and h 1 (z) then follows the fact that the composition of a convex and increasing (decreasing) function with a convex (concave) function is convex [21] .
We are now ready to prove Theorem 5 Proof. By chain rule, we know that
1 (x)| x=0 = −1.
Therefore, by the convexity of h 0 (z), we know that
Similarly, one can prove that
Hence, by the definition of h(z), h(z) ≥ 2(m − n)C − z, which implies that h((m − 2n)C) ≥ mC holds and f * (m−2n)C achieves maximum security and efficiency simultaneously.
